Dittrich, Dennis A.V., Büchner, Susanne and Kulesz, Micaela M (2015) Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 55 . pp. 81-90. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001.

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Abstract

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.

Document Type:	Article
Programme Area:	UNSPECIFIED
Research affiliation:	Social Sciences > Institutional and Behavioural Economics
Refereed:	Yes
Open Access Journal?:	No
DOI:	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001
ISSN:	22148043
Date Deposited:	25 Jul 2019 12:33
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2020 12:59
URI:	http://cris.leibniz-zmt.de/id/eprint/2402

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